element since 1952. 62 years later, in 2014, the wor ding "respect for the principle of the rule of law" ap pears anew at the shores of Eastern Europe in the cor ner-stone-Article of the first new type Agreement of the European Union's Eastern Partnership, namely in the Association Agreem ent between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part (Association Agreem ent).1 "The respect for the principle of the rule of law" to gether with the respect for democratic principles and human rights is entrusted with the herculean task to "form the basis of the domestic and external policies of the Parties and constitute essential elements of this Agreem ent".1 2 This prominent internal and external role of the rule of law mirrors the experience and self understanding of the European Union, as laid down in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in which "the respect for the rule of law", first, explicitly figures as one of the so called values on which the Union is founded,3 second, is expressly emphasized as being "common to the Member States"4 and, third, shall be upheld and promoted in the Union's relations with the wider world.5 In the new Association Agreements with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldava even the Court of Jus tice of the European Union in Luxemburg (CJEU), is entrusted with a binding role for settling disputes over However, in December 2017, challenges of the real world to this objective became evident, when the Euro pean Commission, in a dramatic move, has proposed, for the very first time, that the Council of the Union determines according to Article 7 par. 1 TEU that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by the Member State Poland of the respect for the rule of law, with the poten tial consequence for Poland to lose its voting rights as a member of the Union.1 2 At the same time, the Commis sion, in a procedure according to Article 258 of Treaty Poland's Supreme Court itself referred the same ques tion to the CJEU.1 Moreover, in July the CJEU had already recognized the possibility that the transnational judicial cooperation between Member States in criminal matters, namely the execution of a European arrest war rant issued by a Polish court, might be jeopardised by this development (in a case on the request of the sur render of a person from Ireland to Poland accused of trafficking in narcotic drugs).* 2 These concerns in rela tion to the Polish judiciary might also embrace the re cognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, as provided for in Articles 36 and 39 of the Regulation (EU) No 1215 No /2015 These developments and the fundamental orienta tion of the TEU and the Association Agreement to the "rule of law" raise various basic questions for scho larly reflections. I shall concentrate on four of them from a perspective of legal scholarity: (1.) what is the notion of the rule of law in the specific context of European integration? (2.) W hich are its roots in this context? (3.) Which basic functions are ascribed to and achieved by it? (4.) Which are its current chal lenges? 
A. The Notion of the "Rule of Law" in the Specific Context of European Integration
I. The term "rule of law", as used in the TEU and in the Association Agreement is not identical with any specific concept in the historical writings of "common law" scholars on the "rule of law", such as James Har rington (1656),1 Albert Venn Dicey (1885)1 2 or Lon Fuller (1964),3 although it certainly comprises some of its ele-ments. It is an autonomous term of European law, which, moreover, finds a different wording in any of the equi valent 24 authentic languages of the TEU1 as well as of the EU-Ukraine-Association Agreement:1 2 e. g. in Ukrai nian "verkhovenstvo prava", in French "L' Etat de droit", or in German "Rechtsstaatsprinzip". In particular, the "Rechtsstaats-prinzip" echoes another, continental con cept of the rule of law inspired by Immanuel Kant's enlightened idea of the supremacy of a (written) consti tution.3 But the term "Rechtsstaatsprinzip" in European law is also not identical with any specific concept in the historical writings of continental "civil law" scholars or 12 Peter-Christian Müller-Graff with Article 20 of the German Basic Law, though it su rely comprises central elements of it, which also overlap with elements of the "common law"-perception. This is, in particular, the case for the guarantee of funda mental rights and their protection against public ac tions by independent courts. These elements can be considered as part of the hard core of the European term of the "rule of law".
II. However, I submit that, without prejudice to par ticularities in the national context, the idea of the Eu ropean rule of law, based on ratified Treaties between States, is closer to the continental approach, in particu lar in three respects: first, insofar as the legitimacy of law and public power flows only from a positive codi fication (in the Union: from the Treaties) and not also from precedences of the judiciary as in the common law; second, insofar as any legislation has to respect the constitution (in the Union: the so called primary law as ratified by the Member States) and hence can be subjected to judicial review (in Union law: the an nulment procedure according to Article 263 TFEU) as different from the sovereignty of the legislator in Bri tain; and third insofar as the concept of the separation of public power in the tradition of Montesquieu (1748)1 prevails (in the Union between the European Parlia ment and the Council as the legislature, the Commis sion as the executive and the ECJ as the judiciary). The Rule of Law in European Integration...
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B. The Roots of the Rule of Law in European Integration
The first, very subtle expression of the rule of law is the idea of Treaties as a pacifying element against force and political arbitrariness in the power tensions and competitions between the different realms in Europe. It emerges in the twilight of proposals for European unifi cation as early as 700 years ago in Pierre Dubois' plea for a European Treaty in his book "De recuperatione de terrae sanctae" in 1306.1 This was not yet the idea of the rule of law as perceived today, but only the concept of a role of law in interterritorial relations, namely the "pacta sunt servanda"-principle -Treaties have to be kept. The magic of this principle appears as a gradually increasing red thread in the historical development of the idea of European unification, as particularly elabo rated, after dark war experiences: e. g., after the Thirty Years' War in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's "Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus" in 1693,1 2 then during the Napo leonic wars in Immanuel Kant's "Zum ewigen I. The Hague Congress in May 1948, summoned by a private national organisation, the "U nited Europe Movement", gathered more than 700 participants from 28 European States,4 among them prominent politicians of the time, such as Altiero Spinelli, Konrad Adenauer, Edgar Faure, Francois Mitterand, Winston Churchill and many others, and revealed three aspects concerning the role of law in the idealistic vision at this event.
1. The first aspect concerns the relation between the idea of a federal Europe and the role of law. In its composition the Hague Conference assembled different ideas for the future of Europe from different national groups with different accentuations of Europe's desti ny after the European catastrophies in the first half of the 20th century. In the plentitude of concepts, already basic ideas of a legal framework became visible, in par ticular expressed by those who advocated a Federation of European States, as proposed by the "Union Euro péenne des Fédéralistes", presided by the Dutch Hen drik Brugmans, who delivered the opening speech with the message: "nous voulons que soient créés des insti tutions européennes fédérales, ayant force d'autorité, et capables de cristalliser une société nouvelle des peuples."1 (in translation: W e want the establish ment of federal European institutions with strong autho rity, able to crystallize a new society of peoples). And he added: "rien n'aura été fait, tant que le dogme de la sacro-sainte souveraineté nationale n'aura pas été ren versé"1 (in translation: Nothing will succeed if the sacro sanct dogma of national sovereignty will not be over come). The idea of a federation has, in itself, a legal di mension. It requires a reliable legal order for the partition of sovereign competences and the distribution of tax re venue between the Federation and the States, for the par ticipation of the States in the federal legislative proce dure, for the relation between federal law and regional law and for the judicial review of federal and state acts.
2. The second aspect of the emerging expectations of the law is linked to the idea of an intergovernmental Europe. It is well known that the federal idea was op posed by the British "United Europe Movement", which only aimed at the cooperation between sovereign nation states.1 2 But even this concept had a legal undercurrent, as far as the organisation of such a co-operation was envisaged, though its concrete structures remained vague. The ensuing discussions showed that the Bri tish government was interested only in a loose intergovernemental platform and strictly opposed to the French government's proposals which aimed at the es tablishment of a European organisation in which Ger many would be firmly integrated and controlled.3 3.
The third aspect relates to the final pledge of the Hague Convention. Despite the controversy on the or ganisational perspective, the final pledge sowed the legal perspective and gist for European integration in four if its five parts with the words: "(1) W e desire a United Europe, throughout whose area the free movement of persons, ideas and goods is restored; (2) overriding effect in relation to the national measures concerned nor can they be en forced by the ECHR, the Council of Europe or indi viduals. They only oblige the respective state "to abide by the final judgement of the Court",3 be it reparation, be it "just satisfaction" to the injured party,1 2 3 4 be it an interim measure,5 as, e. g., adopted by the ECHR in the Ukraine/Russia-case calling upon both Contracting Parties concerned to refrain from any measures, which might entail breaches of Con vention rights of the civilian population.6 22 Peter-Christian Müller-Graff II. Second: The idea of the European Community of law in conjunction with the supranational dimension of Community law had, from the very beginning, and still has two dimensions and functions: a static one (1) and a dynamic one (2).
C. The Functions of the Rule of Law in the European Communities and the European Union
1. On the one side, it has a rather static dimension, in the sense of respecting the contractually agreed and de termined togetherness (in legal terminology: the so called primary law). This is the "pacta sunt servanda' -principle.
The core of this dimension is the thought to base the European civil, economic, social and political to getherness on the stabilising authority of law or, more concrete, on contractually, hence voluntarily entered and ratified commitments. It is the vision to durably Peter-Christian Müller-Graff immunize the European togetherness through law against short-term political mood changes, vibrations and relapses into miserable national conflicts of the continent with itself and, in this sense, to gradually depoliticize transnational conflicts. It is, more con crete, the concept to permanently establish the Euro pean togetherness through legally binding -and in case judicially enforceable -commitments to com mon objectives (similar to a partnership agreement1), to mutually binding substantive obligations1 2 (originally especially in order to establish the common market), to mutually guaranteeing the cross-border private ini tiative of the market participants,1 to mutually submit ting to common institutions with legislative and admin istrative powers1 2 and to mutually respecting a common system of legal protection and conflict resolution through a common court.3 In short: it is the plan to civilize the handling of transational egoisms, competitions and con flicts through law. 2. On the other side, the idea of the supranational Community of law comprises the dynamic dimension of progressively creating new or more detailed ele ments of the legally binding togetherness, namely the creation of new primary law and secondary law. This idea can be called: Ius creat ius -law generates law. In this sense it contains also the concept of transna tional civil, economic, social and political net-building, hence integration through law. Scholarly literature on this line of understanding is abundant. Examples are Mauro Cappeletti's and others' enciclopedic efforts in the eighties of last century.4 In this perspective, law is not only understood as a stabilising instrument or ob ject of integration, but as an agent and active subject of integration. This concept assumes that the law of integration does not only shape transnational reality and togetherness, but, once in the world, due to its inner rationale, also generates new law in new chal lenges to the European cohesion. It expects (and even predicts to a certain degree) that the dynamics of inte gration law gradually create new elements of the Eu ropean polity and society. Political scientists labelled this hypothesis as the "functional" or "neo-functional" theory (e. g.: Ernst B. Haas1 on the shoulders of David Mitrany2) in contrast to the pure intergouvernmental theory (Stanley Hoffmann, 3 Andrew Moravcsik4) . It is a hypothesis.
But this hypothesis proved to be true in reality in form of integration milestones and the emancipation of integration law from traditional elements of inter national Treaty law.5 Some headwords might suffice to prove the case. Already the establishment of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Com munity (ECSC) with administrative powers required 1 2 3 4 5 an effective system of judicial protection and led to the creation of the European Court o f Justice (ECJ; today CJEU). The innovative concept of the common market sparked the epocally new idea and reality of internationally founded, but directly applicable indi vidual rights of the market participants before na tional courts1 with primacy over conflicting national law1 2 in the sense of the non-applicability of colliding national law (e. g. of the German prohibition of the marketing of imported beer that did not fulfill the requirements of the German law on purity of beer3). Already in 1964, in the leading case on the relation ship between Community law and national law ("Costa/ENEL") the ECJ held "that the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not ... be overriden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called in question."4 Atten tion has to be given to the ECJ's formulation "domes tic legal provisions, however framed". This wording comprises also constitutional provisions and this con sequence has been expressly confirmed by the ECJ in several later judgements, e. g. in 2010 in the case 
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Peter-Christian Müller-Graff " Winner Wetten" with the words: "Rules of national law, even of a constitutional order, cannot be allowed to undermine the unity and effectiveness of Union la w ".1 This path of establishing European subjective rights, European lega l prim acy and European sovereign rights was successively widened from the former Eu ropean Communities to today's European Union (of Lisbon1 2). In its substance it followed the inner logic of the internal market law. It led -always embedded in law -in particular, towards the objective of the ab sence of internal border controls for persons,3 towards the objective to establish an economic and monetary union4 and towards the widening of the exclusive competence of the Union in commercial policy.5 The conferral of legislative powers to the European level consequently triggered the Act on Direct Elections to the EP,6 the qualified majority principle and the de mographic factor for Council decisions7 and the ordi nary legislative procedure.8 The increase of sovereign European powers consequently set off the require ment of fundamental rights' protection in relation to European administrative and legislative actions1 and national implementation measures1 2 as well as judi cial review criteria such as the principle of propor tionality.3 The intensification of socio-economic trans national contacts brought on the concept of the Un ion's citizenship4 with certain participation rights in other Member States' sovereign rights (in particular in municipial elections5). In this way the "Communi ty of law" has emerged as the backbone of a durable and evolving transnational Union.
III. Third: Summarized, the role of law in European integration has gradually turned from the respect for Treaties into the full-fledged concept of respect for the rule of law: more concrete into a legal order characte rised by the separation of power of European institu tions, by the legality of administration, by the judicial review of political acts, by the emergence of directly applicable subjective rights and by the protection of fundamental rights by independent courts (such as, e. g., the protection of personal data of the young Aus trian lawyer Maximilian Schrems by the CJEU against their transfer by "Facebook" to the United States6).
D. The Challenges to the Rule of Law in European Integration
The question is at hand whether these findings can also hold true for the future of both dimensions and functions of European Union law in light of the current (I) as well as the permanent (II) challenges.
I. First: W ell known current challenges to Union law concern, among others, in particular four, to the law of the economic and monetary union (keyword: budgets of Euro-States in contradiction to the obligation of Ar ticle 126 par. 1 TFEU to avoid excessive deficits); to the asylum rules (keyword: disrepect of the procedural responsibility of the first entry state -the so called Dublin principle1 ); to the requirement of the indepen dence of judges as a core part of the rule of law in the sense of Article 2 TEU (keyword: the Polish cases); and to the supranationality of Union law by the decision of the United Kingdom to withdraw from the Union which is also motivated by the renunciation of the suprana tional European rule of law, legal harmonisation and the jurisdiction of the CJEU.
1. These challenges may identify present limits of the potential of the dynamic function (the "integration through law"). On the other side, it is visible, that, until now, the inner rationale of Union law has not lost its orientating, path guiding force for new political and legal integration initiatives along the lines of the four main operative objectives of the Union (Article 3 TEU)1 2 and their concretizing primary law.
a.
The budget problems of some Euro-States have generated the strong will to avoid the relapse into dif ferent national currencies with their potential for dis tortions of competition in the internal market and with their transaction costs, and have led to the conclusion of a new Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Govern ance in the Economic and Monetary Union3 and to the establishment of a new organisation of mutual support between the present Euro-States, the so called Euro pean Stability Mechanism (ESM). It is a new interna tional organisation which intensifies the intergovern mental coordination of economic and budgetary poli tics on the basis of the provisions for a competitive market economy with far reaching reform-consequen ces for budget-support seeking Euro-States.1 The ESM is a specific form of solidarity driven by the genuine own interest of the Euro-States in stabilising their common currency. The compatibility of this device with Union law has been affirmed by the CJEU1 2 and also explicitily laid down by an amendment to Arti cle 136 TFEU.
b.
The challenge of the migration pressure on Euro pe has revealed the dangers of returning triggered to internal border controls with its restrictions on the free movement of persons and goods and hence has trig gered, at least, some solidarity initiatives on Union level in order to uphold the Dublin principle,1 in par ticular through financially and personally supporting Member States which are most affected by the inflow of nationals of third countries such as Greece, Malta and Italy1 2. However, these efforts don't seem to be suf ficient yet. The relevant solidarity provision in primary law (Article 80 TFEU) needs to be significantly acti vated. In addition, only recently, the strengthening of external border protection devices has gained new momentum.3 A modification of the Dublin-principle by a mechanism of fair distribution of asylum-seekers is discussed.4 The distribution by qualified majority deci sions of the Council, hence against the will of some states, as tried in 2015,5 does not seem meaningful. However, compensation payments of States unwilling to take in their share of asylum seekers under the de bated fairness mechanism,1 seems a reasonable contri bution to guaranteeing free movement without inter nal border controls in the Union.
c. The events concerning the role of the Constitu tional Court and the whole judiciary in Poland have led to the activation o f a new informal instrument (the so called "rule of law" -procedure2), but, due to its ineffectiveness, recently to the triggering of the men tioned procedure to suspend certain Union rights of the Member State in question.3 These questions have, as also mentioned, most recently also arrived at the CJEU: besides the initiative of the Commission also by way of concrete preliminary reference questions of national courts such as the question of an Irish court whether a person, staying in Ireland and accused in Poland, i. a., for trafficking in narcotic drugs, has to be surrendered on the basis of the European Arrest Warrant to a Member State with systemic deficiencies of the independence of its judiciary.4 1 2 3 4 d.
Eventually, the United Kingdom's probable with drawal from the Union and, by that, renunciation of the supranational European rule of law has, until now, united all other M em ber States in appreciating, in principle, the overall advantages of the supranational European rule of law. Moreover, the attempts of the United Kingdom for gaining selective access to the internal market after withdrawing from the Union, without accepting all its rules, has, until now, united all other M em ber States in pursuing the common position of upholding the undivisibility of the inter nal market law concept.1 2. Concerning the more static function of Union law as a durable depoliticization of transnational con flicts, the current challenges may not contain immi nent spill-over threats to it. Internal market law is com plied with to an impressive degree by the Member States. In addition fines imposed on undertakings which viola ted European antitrust law (most recently a € 4,3 billion fine against Google in the Android case2) are appealed before the CJEU, but, if confirmed by the judiciary, they are paid. And the number of preliminary reference procedures from national courts to the ECJ for the in terpretation of Union law has reached a new record.3 However, the realization of this function of European 1 2 3
